Cyberspatial Sovereignties: Offshore Finance, Digital Cash, and the Limits of Liberalism by Maurer, Bill
Indiana Journal of Global Legal
Studies
Volume 5 | Issue 2 Article 7
Spring 1998
Cyberspatial Sovereignties: Offshore Finance,
Digital Cash, and the Limits of Liberalism
Bill Maurer
University of California, Irvine
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls
Part of the Computer Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Internet Law
Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law
School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies by an authorized
administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Maurer, Bill (1998) "Cyberspatial Sovereignties: Offshore Finance, Digital Cash, and the Limits of Liberalism," Indiana Journal of
Global Legal Studies: Vol. 5: Iss. 2, Article 7.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol5/iss2/7
Cyberspatial Sovereignties: Offshore Finance,
Digital Cash, and the Limits of Liberalism
BILL MAURER*
sovereign ('sovrin)... 1. sb. 1. a. One who has supremacy or rank above, or
authority over, others; a superior; a ruler, governor, lord, or master (ofpersons,
etc.). Freq. applied to the Deity in relation to created things.'
In his answer to his article's title question, The Internet as a Threat to
Sovereignty? Thoughts on the Internet's Role in Strengthening National and
Global Governance,' Henry Perritt relies on the liberal theory of international
relations, and liberal understandings of state, market, and morality, to argue that
the Internet does not necessarily pose a threat to sovereignty, but may in fact
bolster it. As Perritt states, "the Internet has the potential to strengthen national
and global governance-thus enhancing sovereignty rather than destroying it."3
From the perspective of national governance, Perritt argues, the Internet can
help strengthen the rule of law by providing access to government documents
and decisionmaking. From the perspective of global governance, the Internet
can help strengthen international law by promoting access to information (from
international treaties to on-the-ground reports of human rights and other abuses)
and by strengthening global markets and economic interdependence.
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Aman, Jr., and the editors of the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies for inviting me to contribute this
article. I would also like to thank the following for suggestions of sources, good conversations about the topic,
and critical readings of various drafts of this article: Eve Darian-Smith, Liisa Malkki, Diane Nelson, Richard
Perry, Henry Pontell, and Wayne Sandholtz. Special thanks to Susan Bibler Coutin for her careful reading and
extremely helpful comments on this article.
1. OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTnONARY 77 (2d ed. 1989).
2. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet as a Threat to Sovereignty? Thoughts on the Internet's Role in
Strengthening National and Global Governance, 5 IND. J. GLoBAL LEGAL STUD. 423 (1998).
3. Id. at 424.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
My response to Perritt is motivated by two chief concerns. The first has to
do with the opposition between liberalism and realism in international relations
(IR) theory within which Perritt situates his arguments. Rather than viewing
liberalism as the antidote to a realist position, which characterizes IR in terms
of anarchy and brute power relations among sovereign states taken to be
abstract actors, I propose we view liberal IR theory as part of an ideology that
encodes and works to enforce problematic visions of state, sovereignty, market,
and morality. Other theoretical trends in IR theory might help us out of the
liberalism/realism impasse and throw into question the implicit moral judgments
about governance, democracy, and international order at the heart of liberalism.
The second concern has to do specifically with Perritt's claims about the
market. Perritt assumes that the Internet can help reduce transaction costs,
making the market more "efficient" and helping more and more people and
governments to become market players. Increasing participation in the market
means, according to Perritt and other neoliberals, increasing interdependence,
which, in turn, means increasing peace among peoples and nations. As Perritt
writes, when "states and their citizens become more vested in the smooth
operation of global markets, prospects for peaceful settlement of disputes
improved because the economic costs of political disruption are too great for
any side to bear."4 He continues: "Under the liberal tradition, it is a positive
achievement to reduce the power of the government over the economy and place
that power in the hands of private citizens, who will trade and invest
internationally, creating economic interdependence that provides a foundation
for world peace."5
In the sections that follow, I explore two recent specific instances where the
Internet has been used as a market-in offshore financial services, or the "tax
haven" business that currently underwrites the economies of several small
Caribbean states, and the "digital cash" initiatives of several computer and
banking firms which promise to "revolutionize" the market itself. This
exploration questions the assumption that increasing economic interdependence,
facilitated by Internet technology, serves the interests of both "sovereignty" and
"world peace." Doing so entails denying "the market" the privileged position it
occupies in Perritt's article, and in much of the writing on globalization from
both the left and the right, as a kind of "black box" whose workings are immune
4. Id. at 439.
5. Id
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to analysis, and which we must at all costs either work to resist, or help to
"grow" and "expand", lest we become its hapless victims.
This article is guided by the assumption that "sovereignty", the construct at
the heart of Perritt's article as well as many of the assessments of Internet
technology and economic globalization, cannot be taken to have given, self-
evident, or stable meanings. Differently positioned persons and governments
have different conceptions of sovereignty and put them into play in state and
market politics in different ways. Notions of sovereignty also change overtime.
Thus, I have chosen to head each section of this essay with definitions of
sovereign from the Oxford English Dictionary.6 My aim in doing this is to
destabilize the terms ofthe debate as I throw light on cases where the meanings
of sovereign, state, market, and subject, and the moral implications of these
meanings, are currently being reformulated and made more complex beyond the
limits of liberal theory.
b. A husband in relation to his wife. Obs.7
One of the advantages of liberal IR theory compared to realism is its
recognition that sovereignty is not a monolithic concept, something that states
simply "have", and that they use as a basis of their power in an anarchic world.
As Perritt argues, liberalism compels us to put "sovereignty" in "its proper
political contexts. . ... ,' For liberals, this proper context ought to be
"democracy", and they argue that one of the main obstacles to the world order
envisioned in liberalism is the continued presence of totalitarian, non-democratic
states. For liberals, sovereignty should not be the preserve of the sovereign
state alone, but must be seen as emanating from the subjects who empower their
state to act in the international arena. Thus, liberal IR theory emphasizes the
goal of"democratization." Perritt's vision of"good governance" hinges on this
liberal ideal. Another key to good governance, according to liberal theory, is
minimal state interference in the affairs ofthe private market where individuals
realize their interests and freely achieve their ends.
6. OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 77.
7. Id.
8. Perritt, supra note 2, at 432.
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Democracy and the free market are equated here: both depend on
individuals able to realize their interests without interference from other
individuals or state agents. Only in such a context can people make consumer
and political choices that reflect their "true" interests. Because, for Perritt, the
Internet can enhance democratization by increasing access to and participation
in governance, and because it can facilitate market transactions, it can therefore
enhance the liberal vision of sovereignty. Only totalitarian states whose
sovereignty depends on control over their subjects have anything to fear from
the Internet.9
Perritt is quite correct to emphasize the political contexts of sovereignty.
Liberalism, however, must at the same time be accountable for its own
assumptions and moral claims, some of which may not hold up under critical
scrutiny. Chief among these, perhaps, is its assumption about the implicit
morality of the "free market", which is presumed to exist above and beyond
politics or culture, to be truly universal, or at least potentially so, if only states
would get out of the business of meddling in the economy. It is no surprise that,
in Perritt's account, the Internet comes to resemble a free market.
There are, however, other trends in IR theory that question the tenets of
liberalism and highlight the shared assumptions of liberalism and realism.
Alexander Wendt labels these trends "critical IR theory", and they include
postmodemism, ° constructivism,"I neo-Marxism, 2 feminism, 3 and others. 4 I
will not review these different contributions in any depth here. Most useful for
my purposes is the theoretical trend called constructivism. Constructivism
draws attention to the fact that the sovereigns, subjects, interests, and identities
presupposed in liberal and realist IR theory are never given, but are actively
9. ld. at431.
10. See R.B.J. WALKER, INSIDE/OUTSIDE: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS POLmCALTHEORY (1993);
Richard Ashley, Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique, 17
MILLENNIUM J. INT'L STUD. 227 (1988).
11. See FRIEDRICHV. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDMONS OFPRACnCAL
AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONALRELATIONS ANDDOMESICAFFAIRS (1989); Friedrich Kratochwil &
John Gerald Ruggie, International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State, 40INT'LORG. 753
(1986); NICHOLAS GREENWOOD ONUF, WORLD OF OUR MAKING: RULES AND RULE IN SOCIAL THEORY AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1989); Alexander Wendt, Constructing International Politics, J. INT'L SECURrrY
71(1992).
12. See ROBERT W. COX, PRODUCTION, POWER, AND WORLD ORDER: SOCIAL FORCES INTHE MAKING OF
HISTORY (1987); STEPHEN GILL, AMERICAN HEGEMONY AND THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION (1990).
13. Anne Sisson Runyan & V. Spike Peterson, The Radical Future of Realism: Feminist Subversions
ofJR Theory, 16 ALTERNATIVES 67 (1991); CHRISTINE SYLVESTER, FEMINIST THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS IN A POSTMODERN ERA (1994).
14. See Wendt, Constructing International Politics, supra note 11.
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constructed, in intersubjective social relationships. The meanings these entities
contain, the kinds of actions they are capable of carrying out, and the moral
implications of those actions are revealed in specific historical, cultural, and
political contexts.'5
As Wendt argues in an influential article that debates in IR between realists
and liberals reveal these parties' "shared commitment to 'rationalism."' Like all
social theories, rational choice directs us to ask some questions and not others,
treating the identities and interests of the agents as exogenously given and
focusing on how the behavior of agents generates outcomes."' 6 Both realists
and liberals, Wendt continues, "take the self-interested state as the starting point
for theory."'7 They also, in the slippage that equates states with individual
human persons, take the self-interested individual as the starting point of theory.
Following Foucault's analysis of liberal governmentality,' 8 I suggest that we
cannot view the kinds of individual persons constructed in modem worlds as
separate from the kinds of states they inhabit and construct and which at the
same time inhabit and construct their personhood. Any constructivist
discussion of the state must also include a constructivist discussion of the
human person. This latter approach is something at which anthropology has
been very good, and I will return to anthropological discussions of the
construction of persons in the next section.
Timothy Mitchell, also following Foucault, argues that the state must be
seen as the effect of relations of power that call it into being as having a force
all its own. He writes that "[t]he state needs to be analyzed as... a structural
effect. That is to say, it should be examined not as an actual structure, but as
the powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear
to exist."'9 For Mitchell, the state is an effect of
detailed processes of spatial organization, temporal
arrangement, functional specification, and supervision and
surveillance, which create the appearance of a world
15. Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make ofit: The Social Construction of Power Politics,
46 INT'L ORG. 391 (1992); ONUF, supra note 11.
16. Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It, supra note 15, at 391-92.
17. Id. at 392.
18. Michael Foucault, Governmentality, in TtEFOucAuLTEFFECr: STUDIESIN GOVERNMENTALITY 87
(Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991); FOUCAULT AND POLITICAL REASON: LIBERALISM,NEO-LBERALISM AND
RATIONALITIES OF GOVERNMENT (Andrew Barry et al. eds., 1996).
19. Timothy Mitchell, The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics, 85 AM.
POL. ScL REv. 77, 94 (1991).
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fundamentally divided into state and society .... These
processes create the effect of the state not only as an entity set
apart from society, but as a distinct dimension of structure,
framework, codification, planning, and intentionality. °
Just as the state is an effect of specific historical circumstances and
relations, so too is sovereignty. Mitchell's analysis of the state can easily be
extended to the sovereign, the market, and the individual person of modem
democracies. In the process of such analysis, all of these constructs must be
momentarily held apart to demonstrate the contingency and historicity of their
linkages (as in the relatively recent historical notion of the "sovereign state", for
example). As Wendt writes, "[t]he sovereign state is an ongoing
accomplishment of practice, not a once-and-for-all creation of norms that
somehow exist apart from practice."2 This statement compels analysts to recall
sovereignty's original definitions, having to do with God-ordained monarchical
power as well as other, not obsolete or hidden definitions like "a husband's
dominion over his wife." As feminist political theorists remind us, of course,
the latter is not a definition of sovereignty substantially challenged by liberal
theory, but in fact reinforced by it.22
I am arguing, thus, that we need to view sovereignty as an effect of
practices and a justification for practices that call it forth as an autonomous
space of power. As my discussion of offshore finance and digital cash below
demonstrates, we need also to view the market as the effect of practices that
construct state and sovereignty and that shape and reshape the human subjects
who enact such practices. Understanding the co-construction of state,
sovereignty, market, and subject throws into relief the moral claims subjects
make in any momentary configuration of these power-effects. Such moral
claims tend to hide or naturalize the very terms-sovereignty, the market, the
rule of law-from which they draw their moral force.
20. Id. at 95.
21. Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of lt, supra note 15, at 413.
22. See CAROLEPATEMAN, THE SExuALCONTRACT(1988). See also IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICEAND
THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990).
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c. A person or thing which excels or surpasses others of the kind. Now rare.23
What kind of subject is presupposed by modem, liberal sovereignty? And
how might Internet technology unsettle it, or at least expose its fabrication?
Authors from across the social sciences have examined the construction of the
modern subject as an autonomous individual, consisting of a stable self, rooted
in a place or nation, relatively solid and unchangeable, knowing its interests and
needs and trying rationally to fulfill them. 4 The subject of liberalism is also
sovereign, in the sense of owning itself and having sole control over its actions
and thoughts. This is what made the subject of liberalism so unique and radical
at its inception during the Enlightenment. Rather than being authored and
animated by God, who placed it in relation to other subjects in a great chain of
being, the liberal subject self-authors, self-regulates, and self-defines. 5
The few ethnographic studies of human-computer interactions that now
exist seem to suggest that the Internet has the potential to reshape this sovereign
subject of modernity by highlighting some of the processes that work to ensure
its seeming stability. In doing so, they echo, ironically enough, anthropological
discussions of conceptions of personhood in societies radically different from
those of the modern West. These conceptions help highlight the contingency
and specificity of the kind of modern subjectivities that underlie market, state,
and sovereignty under liberalism.
In her ethnography about "constructing identity in the culture of
simulation," Sherry Turkle argues that the virtual worlds of the Internet have
the potential to reshape notions of mind, self, body, and machine.2 ' Turkle
begins her investigation with "multiple-user domains" (MUDs), virtual spaces
in which people craft alternate personas (human, non-human, and other) and
interact with such personas crafted by other people (and, often, computers
themselves). As Turkle argues, "MUDs put you in virtual spaces in which you
23. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 77.
24. See, e.g., Jane Collier et al., Sanctioned Identities: Legal Constructions of Modern Personhood,
in21DENITES: GLOBALSTUD.CULTURE&POWER 1 (1995); PErERFrzpATRIcK, THEMYTHOLOGYOFMODERN
LAW (1992); MICHAEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1977); ANTHONY
GIDDENS, MODERNITY AND SELF-IDENTITY: SELF AND SOCIETY IN THE LATE MODERN AGE (1991); C.B.
MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962).
25. See John L. Comaroff, Images of Empire, Contests of Conscience: Models ofColonial Domination
in South Africa, 16 AMERICAN ETHNOLOGIST 661 (1989). See also Bill Maurer, Writing Law, Making a
"Nation'" History, Modernity, andParadoxes of Self-Rule in the British Virgin Islands, 29 L. & SOC'Y REv.
255 (1995).
26. SHERRY TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN: IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET 10 (1995).
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are able to navigate, converse, and build."" To Turkle's informants, their sense
of self, in large measure, often derives from their interactions with other virtual
persona in MUDs. As one put it, "[p]art of me, a very important part of me,
only exists inside PernMUD."28 People can exist in multiple MUDs at once,
through different (or the same) virtual persona. For some of Turkle's
informants, "RL", or "real life", is just one of the many social spaces in which
their personas are engaged at any given time. As one related to her:
I split my mind. I'm getting better at it. I can see myself as
being two or three or more. And I just turn on one part of my
mind and then another when I go from window to window. I'm
in some kind of argument in one window and trying to come on
to a girl in a MUD in another, and another window might be
running a spreadsheet program or some other technical thing
for school .... And then I get a real-time message [that
flashes on the screen as soon as it is sent from another system
user], and I'll guess that's RL. It'sjust one more window. RL
is just one more window ... and it's not usually my best one.29
Turkle's study suggests that participants in Internet communities are engaged
in a deconstruction of some ofthe dichotomies at the heart ofthe liberal subject:
self/other, mind/body, public/private, male/female, etc. In pulling apart these
dichotomies-having experiences on the Internet as a creature of a different
gender, or an imaginary gender, crafting multiple "private" lives in the multiple
"public" spaces of MUDs, and so forth-participants in Internet communities
bring to light the contingency, constructedness, and mutability of the sovereign
subject. As another of Turkle's informants states, "why grant such superior
status to the self that has the body when the selves that don't have bodies are
able to have different kinds of experiences?"3
27.Id at 11.
28. Id. at 12.
29. Id. at 13.
30. Id. at 14.
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In her reflection on subjectivity in the computer age, Allucqu6re Stone
compares the virtual personas created by Internet users with cases of multiple
personality disorder (MPD) in order to make the provocative suggestion that
the Internet demonstrates that the link between a "real" person and their various
"prosthetic" extensions in cyberspace is tenuous, always needing to be
reinforced and recreated." This relationship between real and virtual depends
upon the assertion that the latter is always secondary to the former. This
assertion serves to guarantee to the liberal subject that its Internet personas are
nothing to worry about or be alarmed by. However, she asks, what are we to
make of those cases in which the articulation between real and virtual is broken
or interrupted? Stone discusses the case of a male psychiatrist who
"masqueraded" as a female quadriplegic over the Internet, creating a whole
personality for her and, through her, taking his psychiatric services (pro bono)
on-line. When the ruse became too difficult to maintain, the "real" person
attempted to "kill off' the "virtual" person he had created. 2 Yet, for the
countless women who benefitted from her counseling, the virtual person had
always been a "real" person and continued to exist for them even after the man
was exposed. People expressed longing for her after she was "gone" and
"missed" her. For Stone, the true ruse here was the psychiatrist's initial
assumption that he would maintain "control" over the persona he had created,
since, he thought, it was "only" a fictional extension of his own personality. But
he/she was a very different person in his/her on-line life. Women who
befriended the virtual woman complained, after communicating with the real
man, that they just could not connect with him, something was missing, he just
was not her. Comparing Internet users to people with MPD makes evident all
the work required to forge the liberal subject with one personality, one mind,
and one body. For Stone, that tenuousness holds promise, for in breaking those
links between real and virtual, she argues, human subjects can refigure the
relationship between them, privilege the virtual over the real, recognize that the
31. See ALLUCQUtRE ROSANN STONE, THE WAR OF DESIRE AND TECHNOLOGY AT THE CLOSE OF THE
MECHANICAL AGE (1995).
32. See id. at 69-76.
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real is just as virtual as the virtual, break the liberal subject apart, and explore
new ways of being in the world."
To an anthropologist, there is something familiar in the descriptions of the
kinds of subjects people can be through Internet technology. No longer
sovereign individuals with solid, fixed identities, these persons seem partible,
divisible, and consciously constructed through their relationships with other
personas even as the relationships themselves seem prior to the constructed
person. The virtual psychiatrist only "truly" came to exist as she was
constituted in her relationships with other persons over the Internet. There was
nothing "there" beforehand-which is why the "real" psychiatrist thought he
was doing nothing other than play-acting a role until he realized that the role
had become its own person. Partible persons, persons who are "dividuals", not
"individuals", persons defined by relationships instead of autonomous selves
who are selves first and form relationships second, are also the characters of the
contemporary ethnography of Melanesia, as that body of literature has been
transformed by scholars like Marilyn Strathern34 and Debbora Battaglia." As
Strathern writes:
Far from being regarded as unique entities, Melanesian
persons are as dividually as they are individually conceived.
They contain a generalized sociality within. Indeed, persons
are frequently constructed as the plural and composite site of
the relationships that produced them. The singular person can
be imagined as a social microcosm. 6
Strathern revisits earlier ethnographic accounts of Melanesian society and
persons (an opposition which her book seeks to undercut) and finds that they
also noted the primacy of relationships over selves. As Maurice Leenhardt
wrote in 1947, a living being "knows himself only by the relationships he
maintains with others. He exists only insofar as he acts his role in the course
33. See id. at 76-81.
34. MARILYN STRATHERN, THE GENDER OF THE GIFT (Gilbert H. Herdt et a]. eds., 1988).
35. RHErORIcsOFSELF-MAKING(DebboraBattagiaed., 1995);DEBBoRABAT-rAGLIA, ONTHEBONESOF
THE SERPENT: PERSON, MEMORY, AND MORTALITY IN SABARL ISLAND SOCIETY (1990).
36. STRATHERN, supra note 34, at 13.
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of his relationships."37 Leenhardt depicts the person of New Caledonia as a
series of lines (a ---- b) representing relationships, radiating out from a central
space, which he characterized as "empty":
Their social reality is not in their body but in this empty place
where they have their names and which corresponds to a
relationship.... But no name can cover the whole person.
The Canaque [Caledonian] is obliged to have a different name
for every domain which involves his person in various
relationships and participations. In all this, he is unaware of
himself; he is the empty space enclosed by the circle of a's. 8
Strathern argues that Leenhardt's only mistake was to worry over that empty
space at the center. She writes:
[H]is mistake was to conceive of a center at all. The center is
where twentieth-century Western imagination puts the self, the
personality, the ego. For the "person" in this latter day
Western view is an agent, a subject, the author of thought and
action, and thus "at the center" of relationships. 9
For Melansians (like MUD-users?) there simply is no "empty center." Instead,
there are relationships conceived as prior to the person, which create and
support the person, itself a microcosm of those social relationships.
d. A free citizen or voter of America. US. Obs.'°
Unlike the Melanesian persons described by Strathern, however, the
partible, flexible, and dividual ofthe Internet intersects with neoliberal market
logic, in which everything is subordinate to the "global economy." The question
of sovereignty posed by globalization is never merely the sovereignty of states
37. MAURICELEENHARDT,DOKAMo: PERSONANDMYTHNTEMELANESiAN WoRLD 153 (Basia Miller
Gulati trans., 1979).
38. STRATHERN, supra note 34, at 269 (quoting LEENHARDr, supra note 37, at 154, 156).
39. Id.
40. OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 77.
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but also the sovereignty of persons conceptualized as autonomous individual
agents. We need to counterpose the rugged individualism of old markets with
the prosthetic Internet dividuals of potential new markets while we
simultaneously interrogate the old, supposedly solid, sovereign states of
modernity and the potential for such states to be "losing control" of their
sovereignty in the face of globalization.4 1 The literature on globalization is
mostly preoccupied with the latter-with states and their potential erosion or
bolstering-and relatively silent on the former. The cases I present here bring
to the fore both the potential reconstruction of the subject made possible in the
confluence of Internet technology and neoliberal markets and the potential de-
linking and reconfiguration of the state-sovereignty relationship. These cases
suggest that the debate on "whither the sovereign state?", within which Perritt's
article is located, is misguided. It is misguided precisely because it presumes
a link between state and sovereignty and the valences these two terms hold when
apart from each other. A "non-sovereign" state can still be a very powerful
state indeed; a "sovereign" state can be relatively powerless; and, as its earlier
meanings suggest, a sovereign need not have anything to do with a state at all.
In this section, I examine recent discussions about the subjectivity behind
offshore financial services and the kinds of persons who are supposed to inhabit
such offshore worlds. I am interested in the new person these discussions seek
to call into being. The person seems, at first glance, like the rugged individual
of old American mythology. But, it is also strangely centerless and rootless,
possesses changeable interests and skills, and seems unstable and flexible.
This vision ofthe person is not limited to offshore finance enthusiasts; it is also
put forward in other quarters, from new management tracts to Wired.
Internet-based discourse about the person participating in offshore finance
tends to focus on the problem of citizenship. In their promotional literature, tax
haven specialists proclaim citizenship to be a changeable, flexible status to be
picked up and dropped at will. Many provide advice on how to acquire multiple
citizenships. Adam Starchild, an offshore finance proselytizer who is prominent
on the World Wide Web, encourages investors to dispense with what he views
as ancient, irrational, primordial sentiments and attachments, and instead to
embrace a late capitalist nomadism he terms "PT":
41. See SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1996).
42. See EMILY MARTIN, FLEXIBLE BODIES: TRACKINO THE ROLE OF IMMUNITY IN AMERICAN
CULTURE-FROM THE DAYS OF POLIO TO TIE AGE OF AIDS (1994).
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The majority of Somalis are nomads who have proved
themselves gratifyingly resistant to the chaos of civil war and
famine. While Western attention has been focused on farmers
and devastated city dwellers, the nomads continue to use their
mobility-as they have for centuries-to avoid much of the
hardship.
Cities and mechanized agriculture, the results of
"civilization," are the first to be hurt when the structure of
civil order collapses. War has destroyed the largest towns;
farmers were quickly cut off from supplies with the onset of
hostilities.
Nomads, with their camel, goat, and sheep herds, are
highly mobile and can generally avoid areas where there is
fighting.
On an international scale there is a survival lesson here for
the civilized world as well. Do you want to escape the control
over your life and property now held by modem governments?
The PT concept could have been called Individual Sovereignty,
because PTs look after themselves. We don't want or need
authorities dominating every aspect of our existence from
cradle to grave. The PT concept is one way to break free.
In a nutshell, the PT merely arranges his or her
"paperwork" in such a way that all governments consider him
a tourist-a person who is just "passing through." The
advantage is that being thought of by government officials as
a person who is merely "parked temporarily," a PT is not
subject to taxes, military service, lawsuits, or persecution for
taking part in innocent but forbidden pursuits or pleasures.
Unlike most citizens or subjects, the PT will not be persecuted
for his beliefs or lack of them. PT stands for many things: a
PT can be a "prior taxpayer," "perpetual tourist," "practically
transparent," "privacy trained," or "permanent traveler," if he
or she wants to be. The individual who is a PT can stay in one
place most of the time. Or all of the time. PT is a concept, a
way of life, a way of perceiving the universe and your place in
it. One can be a full-time PT or a part-time PT. Some may
not want to break out all at once, or become a PT at all. They
just want to be aware of the possibilities, and be prepared to
1998]
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modify their lifestyle in the event of a crisis. Knowledge will
make you a sort of PT-a "possibility thinker" who is
"prepared thoroughly" for the future. 43
Starchild's rhetoric suggests a kind of person, one apart from state and
society, almost like the rugged individual of olden days. Yet, this person is
different. It is not unitary, but multiple and flexible, able to adapt to new
circumstances quickly and easily. It only has its own self to rely on, it owes
nothing to society for its self and it owns itself, like the modern subject
conceptualized by Hobbes and Locke." Yet, the PT is complexly changeable.
Like the imagined Somali nomad, it can pack up and leave at a moment's notice,
rearrange its paperwork, and blend into whatever new surroundings it finds
itself in. This notion of the person resonates with trade publications on "new
workers" in "high-risk society." Take, for instance, one of Newt Gingrich's
favorite tomes, Working Without A Net:43
The high risk culture seems to be a frightening place, but it
doesn't have to be .... Learning to work without a net makes
discomfort tolerable. Working without a net doesn't mean
taking crazy risks. It means becoming less reliant on
traditional symbols of security such as one particular job...
In effect, we exchange our external nets for internal ones.
Internal security nets are portable. When we take a newjob or
take on a new challenge, our inner strengths travel with us.'
Consider yet another book in the same vein, but aimed at a different audience,
Managing Generation X:
43. Adam Starchild, The Offshore Entrepreneur (last visited April 27, 1998) <http://www.au.com/
offshore/sample/beaptdontliveany.html>. As Susan Coutin has pointed out to me, it is curious that Starchild
chooses to glorify the mobility of camel-herders and not, for instance, of unemployed urban dwellers or migrant
workers.
44. See C.B. MACPHERSON, THEPOUTCALPHILOSOPHYOFPOSSESSIVEINDiviDuAtuSM: HOBBESToLOCKE
(1962). See also Collier, supra note 24.
45. MoPms R. SHECrrMAN, WORKING WrrHourA NET 6 (1994) (describing a safety-net, or social welfare
policies). These various texts all beg the question ofthe practices and policies responsible for "insecurity" in
the first place.
46. Id. at 6.
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Managers who are beginning to understand Generation X
already know that Xers' intense ambition is part of our quest
for security in this unstable world. Xers are ambitious for
regular confirmation of our success at work because we are
working on short-term contracts-we provide managers with
valuable work products in exchange for managers'
commitment to making us more valuable commodities in the
workplace.... our work-repertoires and creative abilities are
the only long-term assets on which we can depend.... Xers
think of ourselves as the sole proprietors of our own creative
prowess-we have to be entrepreneurial with our skills and
abilities in order to build within ourselves portable assets for
the future. Thus, entrepreneurial Xers are creating a new kind
of career security which fits with the economy of the future-a
career security which is not tied to any one company, manager,
customer or client. Xers are building a form of career security
which resides within ourselves."'
Becoming a PT seems to be the only solution to the instability and insecurity of
the world these authors describe. Jurisdictions that offer offshore financial
services have positioned themselves in the business of helping to make
Starchild's PT vision a reality. Many of the same Caribbean states marketing
their offshore financial services are also marketing their citizenship. They
piggy-back such "cash-and-carry citizenships" with offshore finance: "most
Americans invest in a second nationality as a way to reduce or avoid U.S.
taxes."48 St. Kitts and Nevis, which is just beginning to get into the game of
offshore finance, offers citizenship for a mere $250,000 and an investment in
real estate.49 New citizens of Caribbean islands "view their new citizenship as
a gateway to the world""° and as a hedge against the increasing insecurity that
Shechtman's netless workers (who, of course, while wired out of the welfare
safety net, are wired into the Internet), Tulgan's Gen-Xers, and Starchild's PTs
encounter.
47. BRucETULGAN, MANAGING GENERATION X: HoWTOBRiNGOurTHE BEST INYOUNGTALENT 114-15
(1996).
48. Mark Fineman, Resort Islands Now Offer Cash-and-CarryCitizenship, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 28,1997,
at AS.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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I should pause here to emphasize that I am not arguing that we are all
becoming PTs, or that Internet technology is going to make us all start carrying
around seventeen passports along with our laptops, faxes, modems, and cell
phones as we compete on a global labor market with other individuals similarly
decked-out with new technologies and identity papers (another Newt Gingrich
vision of the future). I am also, of course, not arguing that the state is over, it
is all the global market, and we had better start dealing with it. I am not
claiming that authors like Starchild, Shechtman, and Tulgan are accurately
describing a world coming into being. Rather, I am claiming that such texts
represent increasingly common discourses about the global economy and the
place of state, citizenship, and identity in it. Policymakers, academics,
journalists, and fictional television characters also speak these discourses.
My argument rests on the belief that these discourses are in themselves
important, whether or not we believe they capture some "truths" of what may
be an emerging new world order. They are the kinds of practices that have the
potential to reshape the moral universe within which many people currently
move, think, and work. Arid they may be doing so in various quarters. But
assessing whether or not, or to what extent, they are doing so is not my current
task. Rather, I simply wish to look at sites of meaning-production within which
state, market, sovereignty, and subject are being reconceptualized, for doing so
calls into question the implicit meanings animating Perritt's article. The worlds
of offshore financial services and digital cash, I argue, are two such sites.
2. spec. a. The recognized supreme ruler of a people or country under
monarchical government; a monarch; a king or queen."
In April 1997, the world's first Internet offshore bank went into
receivership. Incorporated in the mid- 1980s in the Caribbean island ofAntigua,
the European Union Bank (EUB) established a website in 1994 to attract
wealthy clients looking for places to invest their money outside the regulatory
and revenue authorities of their home countries. The EUB promised high
51. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note I, at 77.
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interest rates and "complete financial confidentiality." 2 All manner of shady
characters-from the bank's former chairman, the "reformed heroin addict"
Lord Mancroft, to Russian-born owners with links to the KGB and "Russian
mobsters"-were reported to have been involved in the scandal that brought the
bank down. 3  Because the EUB, incorporated in the independent
Commonwealth of Antigua and Barbuda, falls outside the Bank of England's
"supervisory remit", "British investors... will receive no compensation" for
their losses.'
Antigua has been at the center of a boom in cyberspace financial activity,
including banking, offshore trust companies, and offshore gambling. It boasts
no tax on income or capital gains and relative ease of incorporation. Antigua's
dozen or so "virtual casinos" pay $100,000 a year into government coffers for
"an Internet casino license that offers a... promise of minimum regulation,
maximum anonymity and tax-free profit."55
Recent media accounts of the offshore sector echo, and often quote directly
from, a U.S. State Department report on narcotics trafficking, released in
March 1997, by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs. 6 In the section on Antigua, the State Department report explicitly links
offshore financial services with narcotics money laundering and lauds efforts
on the part of the Antiguan government to combat criminal activities with new
legislation. 7 Meanwhile, Antiguan government concern over potential bad
press in the wake of the EUB scandal led to the posting of new offshore
regulations on the government's web-page. 8
What is the basis of the assumption that these offshore financial activities
are always suspect, and why are newspapers so eager to report Antiguan
banking scandals? Although newspaper accounts and U.S. government reports
emphasize the financial sector's links to organized crime and drug trafficking,
it is likely that much of the financial activity has to do with wealthy individuals'
(or, more likely, their financial managers') efforts to evade the taxes of their
52. Richard Miles, Internet 's First Offshore Bank Collapses, GUARDiANWEEKLY, Aug. 17,1997, at 14.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Mark Fineman, "Virtual Casinos"Cash In on LaxRules inAntigua, L.A.TIMES, Sept. 21, 1997, at
A16.
56. BuREAu FOR INTERNATIONALNARCOTICS ANDLAWENFORCEMENTAFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'TOF STATE,
INTERNATIONALNARCOTICsCONTROLSTPATEGY REPoRT, 1996(1997) [hereinafter STATE DEPARTMENT 1997],
available at <http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcoticslaw/1996 
_narc-report/carib96.html>.
57. See id. at 198-202.
58. See Offshore Business in Antigua andBarbuda <http://www.antigua-barbuda.com/offshore.html>.
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home countries.59 I do not mean to trivialize the risks of fraud inherent in
offshore banking. Nor do I mean to endorse offshore investing or the moral
ambiguity of evading taxes in the name of pecuniary gain. I also do not want
to be taken as a supporter of Prime Minister Lester Bird's government, racked
by numerous scandals and allegations of shady dealings for decades. At the
same time, however, I am hesitant to endorse the U.S. government's response
to the "threat" of money laundering in Antigua and other offshorejurisdictions,
which has taken the form of "Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties" that
subordinate local authorities (corrupt though they may be) to U.S. government
agencies.'
While my concern here may seem to be about the "sovereignty" of
independent governments in the face of what we might call U.S. narco-
enforcement imperialism, I am, in fact, less interested in the putative autonomy
of small states' governments (and threats to it) than I am in the rhetorical
constructions of state, sovereignty, market, and morality brought into play in
writings on offshore finance. The newspaper reports, for instance, only cover
part of the story. They often omit any explanation of why small states like
Antigua are in the game of offshore finance, citizenship for sale, and Internet
casinos in the first place.
The U.S. government's position on offshore finance, embodied in the State
Department report,6 holds that weak, small states, like Antigua, find themselves
overwhelmed by a global organized crime network; this, together with local
government corruption, warrants the United States' "mutual legal assistance."
59. See ANTHONY GINSBERG, TAx -IAvENs (1991). See also Bill Maurer, Complex Subjects: Offshore
Finance, Complexity Theory, and the Dispersion of the Modern, SOCIALIST REV., VOL. 95 (3 & 4), at 113;
Susan Roberts, Fictitious Capital, Fictitious Spaces: The Geography of Offshore Financial Flows, in MONEY,
SPACE, AND POWER 91 (Stuart Corbridge et al. eds., 1994). 1 want to emphasize here the normalcy of offshore
investing. As Ginsberg notes, as much as 50% ofthe world's money sits "offshore" at any given time. GINSBERG,
supra note 59, at 7. While tax evasion is a significant part of offshore finance, many multinational companies
make use of offshore centers simply to move money from one part of the company to another, and simply to
keep their money moving during a 24-hour global trading day, transferring assets from one offshore site to
another, to major onshore financial centers, and on to the next offshore center, following the trading day as the
planet spins on its axis.
60. See Maurer, Writing Law, supra note 25.
61. Of course, it is difficult to get a handle on a single "U.S. government position", given its many-
headedness. I do not have the space here to compare the State Department report cited earlier with Department
of Treasury reports, Federal Reserve reports, and the Financial Action Task Force's reports. The differences
are especially significant in the digital cash debates, which I discuss below. See Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Report to Congress on the Application of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act to
Electronic Stored- Value Products (visited Apr. 6, 1998) <http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/boarddocs/RptCongress/
efta~rpt.pdf.>; Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, FA TF- VIIReport on Money Laundering
Typologies, (Aug., 1996) <http://www.treas.gov/fincen/advis4.pdf - .
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But how do Caribbean leaders who write offshore finance legislation author
state, sovereignty, market, and morality?
As I have discussed elsewhere," Caribbean leaders involved in promoting
their territories as offshore financial service centers invent and then emphasize
unique identities for theirjurisdictions, stressing stability, reputation, security,
and secrecy. They are actively involved in the marketing of their niche for
capital. For these leaders, sovereignty in its liberal sense is not the goal nor
even on the screen. For many, such as leaders in the British Virgin Islands and
Cayman Islands, sovereignty, in the liberal sense, which would entail political
independence from the United Kingdom, is perceived to have the ability to
destroy the financial services business. These jurisdictions' links to Britain,
given local legislative autonomy, are only formalities at this point. However,
they are deemed central to the jurisdictions' "reputations" on the market of
international financial services. Furthermore, in a region where "free trade" has
meant the decimation of export agriculture, where grants from the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office are rarer and smaller because of Britain's desire to shuck
off its remaining colonies, and where tourism can no longer bring in the
revenues it once did, marketing a jurisdiction to offshore investors seems a
reasonable route to economic health."3 A new "native" of St. Kitts-Nevis, an
offshore finance analyst, explains, "[o]ur governments need the income....
The time when you could go and beg for money from England or the United
States is gone. We've got to get some kind of income to live on."'
The social and political forces behind offshore finance suggest that there are
at least two interconnected ways to view the active construction of sovereignty,
market, state, and morality by Caribbean leaders involved in offshore finance.
These differ significantly from the U.S. State Department's assumptions about
the business and from liberal expectations. The first consists of a vision of
weak states overpowered by the "normal" procedures of the global economy
which demand that they market themselves as places of distinction, within
which specialized services can occur. The second is a vision of states governed
by leaders who are fully aware that the link between state and sovereignty
62. See Maurer, Writing Law, supra note 25; Maurer, Complex Subjects, supra note 59; Bill Maurer,
Creolization Redux: The Plural Society Thesis and Offshore Financial Services in the British Caribbean,
71 NEw W. INDIAN GUIDE 249 (1997). See also Roberts, Fictitious Capital, supra note 59.
63. See Ronald Sander, The Growing Vulnerability ofSmallStates: The Caribbean Revisited, 343 TmE
ROUNDTABLE 361 (1997). This article has been republished-not surprisingly-on the Antigua and Barbuda
homepage at <http://www.antigua-barbuda.comlcommon.html>.
64. Fineman, Resort Islands Now Offer Cash-and-Carry Citizenship, supra note 48.
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increasingly distorts their state's position in the world economy and their state's
identity as a state. These leaders recognize that the state must become an
apparatus that facilitates capital mobility (just as the Internet becomes a
mechanism to facilitate capital mobility). For such leaders, sovereignty, in its
traditional liberal sense, is moot. Perhaps the real "sovereign" in this vision is
outside the state, above and beyond it, transcendent, like the feudal monarchs
whose power purportedly derived from and was ordained by God.
4.a. A gold coin minted in England from the time of Henry VII to Charles I,
originally of the value 22s. 6d. but subsequently worth only 1 Os. or I1 s.65
Let's turn to another case where the terms sovereignty, state, market, and
morality seem to signify in ways that may undermine Perritt's liberalism and
cause us to make predictions about the Internet's impact more complex., This
case originates not in small Caribbean microstates, but in the halls of major
multinational banks like Citicorp and computer software giants like Microsoft
and Intuit. For the past five years, these corporations have been floating ideas
and testing products designed to replace physical cash as a medium of exchange
by using the Internet and other computer technology. Such efforts to create
"digital cash" or "e-cash", prototypes of which already exist on the World Wide
Web' and can be used to carry out economic transactions, have generated
arguments about the end of money itself. These arguments have called into
question the institution of central banks, the future role of nation-states, and
their abilities to regulate--or even endorse-their national currencies, in new
economies of cyberspace.67
65. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 77.
66. See, e.g., CyberCash (visited Apr. 7,1998) <http://www.cybercash.com>. See also Michael Krantz,
Cyber Vending Machine, TIME, Oct. 7, 1996, at 78; James Staten, CyberCash Pays Over Web, MACWEEK,
Feb. 6, 1996, at 4; James Staten, CyberCash Ushers in New Era, MACUSER, May 1996 at 37.
67. See RobertM. Metcalfe, Daniel Lynch: Founding Chairman of CyberCash, Inc., INFOWORLD, Jan.
29,1996, at 74; Michael Schrage, Carl Pascarella: Branding Digital Cash: Visa Plans the Leap From Value
Exchange to Information Exchange, MEDIAWEEK, May 29, 1995, at IQ14; Kim Nash, Cybercash at Risk:
Money Laws Lacking, COMPTrrERWORLD, Dec. 23, 1996, at 1; Simon Fluendy, Virtual Money: Does
Cybercash Have a Future in Asia? FAR E. ECON. REv., Nov. 7, 1996, at 83; Patiwat Panurach, Money in
Electronic Commerce: Digital Cash, Electronic Fund Transfer, and Ecash, 39 COMM. OF THE ACM 45
(1996); Karrie Jacobs, DigitalDollars, IND. DESIGN MAG., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 66; David Peyton, Here Comes
E-cash, But Washington Isn'tReady, COMPUTERWORLD, July 3, 1995, at 37; Andrew Singleton, Cash on the
Wirehead, BYTE, June 1995, at 71; Ellis Booker, Financial Services Spread Across the Web,
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Again, my aim here is not to support these accounts of the end of money or
the nation-state, or to claim that such accounts actually have purchase on
"reality" as it is unfolding. I am very wary of the prophetic claims of both
supporters and detractors of digital cash, who alternately claim that digital cash
will unify the world in one glorious common market and make nation-states a
thing of the past (and, with them, wars, poverty, famine), or that digital cash is
just one small step away from the total commodification of everything-that
"we'll all be tattooed with something akin to a universal pricing code to make
sure we're not using someone else's" digital money, and "[h]idden in the code
will be the numbers '666.' And we all know what that means. "6' Rather, as with
the discourse on PTs and offshore finance, I am interested in these discourses
themselves for the ways they destabilize and re-write liberal conceptions of
sovereignty, state, subject, and market. Whether or not those discourses
translate into the kind of practices that produce new effects-new states, new
persons-is an open question. They do, however, highlight the limits of
liberalism. And that is a useful thing.
Much of the recent writing on digital cash emphasizes its utter normalcy.
Scott Cook, the CEO of Intuit (the market leader in personal finance software),
has stated that "financial products are already electronic. Wealth isn't stored in
gold bars or coins or stock certificates anymore. It's stored on mainframe hard
drives. Between financial institutions, finance is already digital."69 An author
for Fortune has also remarked, "it's still just money. For currency traders and
others dealing in huge sums, who have long been able to zap billions of dollars
across the globe in seconds, money as electrons isn't anything new. Nearly
COMPUTERWORLD May 15,1995, at 12; Charles Arthur, How To Cash in on the Net, NEw SciEwrmST, Feb. 18,
1995, at 19; Gary H. Anthes, Digital Cash Solution Sought, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 26, 1994, at 24; Eva
Freeman, How to Move E-CashAroundthe Internet, DATAMA'ION, Oct. 1996, at 58; Amy Cortese, The Future
of Money: E-cash Could Transform the World's Financial Life, Bus. WK., June 12, 1995, at 66; James
Gleick, Deadas a Dollar, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 16, 1996, at 26. See generally Sebastian Rupley, All the
Web's a Wallet-Or Soon Will Be, PC MAG., May 28, 1996, at 60 (providing a precis of five books on the
topic).
68. Justin Fox, What's New About Digital Cash? FORTUNE, Sept. 30, 1996, at 51.
69. Gene Koprowski, The Money Changers: Digital Cash Innovators Talk Banks, Bits, Bytes and
Bucks, FoRBEs, Aug. 26, 1996, at 68.
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ninety percent of the money that changes hands in the United States every day
does do electronically." 70
Digital cash endeavors seek to capture that remaining ten percent through
innovative technologies like "smart cards" embedded with a chip containing
information representing downloaded money, which serves as the medium of
exchange, or software-based on-line "cybercash", which can be used over the
World Wide Web to conduct transactions .currently involving credit cards.7
Cybercash makes small fee-for-use schemes possible and profitable. It allows
aspiring "online entrepreneurs ' 72 to earn money by, for example, charging Web-
surfers a dollar or fifty cents to use on-line software, play a game, or read a
story.73 Many such enterprises probably cannot afford to accept Visa or
Mastercard, and few on-line consumers would be likely to hand over their credit
card numbers for such a tiny transaction.
There are two chief worries put forward in the business press about digital
cash. The first is that it will erode the sovereignty of the nation-state by taking
away from sovereign states their ability to control their money supply. The
second is that it will lead sovereign states to interfere in the free market of
cyberspace in the name of guaranteeing the security of Internet transactions.
On the one hand, the state will weaken and fall apart; on the other, it will ruin
the market by being too strong.
The first worry is a species of the "globalization is weakening states"
argument. Here, the forces of the market are portrayed as usurping sovereignty
from the nation-state. Specifically, digital cash represents the end of central
banks' abilities to regulate the money supply, rendering currencies
"unmanageable."74 Peter Newman argues that "[t]his will mean a separation
between nations and their own economies, the 2P-century equivalent of the
church-and-state split of the 19-century."71 Critics of this position point out
that money has been "imaginary stuff' for quite some time, "its value derived
70. Fox, supra note 68, at 50.
71. See Koprowski, supra note 69, at 70. See also Peter C. Newman, E-Cash: A Looming Financial
Revolution, MAcLEAN'S, June 26, 1995, at 30.
72. Michael Krantz, Cyber Vending Machine, TIME, Oct. 7, 1996, at 78.
73. See Staten, CyberCash Pays Over Web, supra note 66, at 4. See also Staten, CyberCash Ushers
in New Era, supra note 66, at 37.
74. See Newman, supra note 71, at 30.
75. Id.
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purely from trust," and that "switching from paper imaginary money to digital
imaginary money simply isn't that big a deal."76
The second worry, interestingly enough, stems from fears of the potential
for digital money transactions to become a kind of offshore finance and money
laundering activity. Both supporters and opponents of digital money voice this
concern." As one opponent stated, "[flunds floating in cyberspace will become
the ultimate tax haven. The more money that vanishes into the untaxable ether,
the less tax will be paid by sophisticated computer traders - which will place
an extra tax burden on society's computer-challenged citizens, who will be least
able to carry the burden. 78  "Money laundering will become fast and simple.
The existence of untraceable funds will encourage criminal activities."79
Supporters of digital money, however, see states' responses to this potential as
the real danger. U.S. Comptroller Eugene Ludwig has voiced concerns about
"the potential severity of any e-money-related criminal activity," and has called
for increased government regulation."' Industry specialists counter that the
industry can best regulate itself, and that the market will weed out bad players.
Furthermore, as Forbes reports, "if government rules become too burdensome,
electronic money players will simply shift their operations overseas. One
member of the Chicago Merc, Rand Financial Services, relocated to Bermuda
to be free of onerous regulation by the federal government."'"
According to promoters, their own market dominance ensures that the
market will work to keep criminality out of digital economies. In a world where
"trust" is the ultimate backer of currencies, and where essentially private
currencies like digital cash have an increasingly important role to play in the
76. Fox, supra note 68, at 54.
77. See Newman, supra note 71, at 30. See also Koprowski, supra note 69, at 71, 74.
78. Newman, supra note 71, at 30.
79. Id.
80. Koprowski, supra note 69, at 73. There is more to say here, of course, about the many heads of the
state and the way that certain reports and recommendations of regulatory or advisory bodies get put to all sorts
of purposes their authors probably never envisioned. Take, for instance, one of my own papers on offshore
finance, Bill Maurer, Law Writing, Immigration, and Globalization in the British Virgin Islands, 2 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 413 (1995), being republished on the World-Wide Web through the House of
Representatives Internet Law Library service at<http://law.house.gov/246.html>. In the debates over digital
cash, there is a story (which I do not have space here to tell) about the way the Department of Treasury used
the Federal Reserve's report on e-cash tojustify denying electronic benefits payments (EBT) to people on
welfare, despite the fact that the Federal Reserve report had absolutely nothing to do with EBT. In addition to
the Federal Reserve report to Congress cited above, see Federal Reserve System, 12 CFR Part 205 [Regulation
E; Docket No. R-0959] Electronic Fund Transfers, Final Rule, (visited Apr. 28, 1998)
<http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/boarddocs/press/ BoardActs/1997/19970813/R-0959.pdf>.
81. Koprowski, supra note 69, at 74.
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exchange and accumulation of wealth, digital cash companies that can bolster
their trustworthiness in the eyes of consumers will "win" in the long run, and
those that cannot will be forced out of the market. As Scott Cook from Intuit
states, "brand names will become more important:"
If you're going to deal with a financial institution remotely,
all you have to go by is the brand, the record of service and
trustworthiness that stands behind it. You can compare it to
the process that grocery products went through over the last
century. Brands were not important in groceries a hundred
years ago-you used to trust your local grocer to tell you if
the crackers were good. But now you trust Nabisco or
another brand. The same will be true of banks.82
Similarly, Sholom Rosen, Citibank's vice president for emerging technologies,
states: "You may not be loyal to your bank yet, but the idea is to make you
loyal by providing services that make your life a lot easier." 3
One reason industry experts fear government intrusion is the potential for
private economic transactions to lose the anonymity they now have (for some).
If consumers know that government agents can peek into their digital cash
transaction histories, they will be less willing to use the product and will stick
to old-fashioned paper money. As David Chaum, CEO of Digicash, told
Forbes, "the real home run is to replace paper money. This will never be
achieved without an electronic payment system that allows people to protect
their privacy, which Digicash now offers. ''" An overriding assumption here is
that consumers do actually seek anonymity. The take-home message in most
of the business press accounts is that digital cash is nothing to worry about, that
it will make everyone's life easier, and that it will take care of itself if only the
state leaves it be.
82.Id. at68.
83. Id. at 71. See also Schrage, supra note 67, at IQ14, IQ16.
84. Koprowski, supra note 69, at 70.
85. See Fox, supra note 68, at 50. See also Krantz, supra note 72, at 78.
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5. A variety of pear. Obs."6
There are obvious parallels in accounts of offshore finance and digital cash,
most notably in the fears about money laundering and the emphasis on creating
reputations of trustworthiness. But these parallels are deceptive. The issue of
anonymity and secrecy is fore-grounded for both phenomena. However, at least
in popular accounts, secrecy in offshore finance is the vice that allows shady
dealings, while secrecy in digital cash is the virtue that will boost the market
share of digital cash providers. At the root of the moral concern with secrecy
in the first case is the dividual presumed to engage in potentially illicit behavior,
the rootless PT who owes allegiance to no one and nothing, whose citizenship
is a commodity purchased like any other, delineating no particular loyalty to
state or sovereign. Yet the person interested in secrecy in digital cash is much
the same. It seeks a non-state-based free global market through the Internet; its
interests lie in protecting its own autonomy from the prying eyes of the state or
of Visa International, which might like to know its spending habits and might
like to trace its purchasing history. Why are there no warning-bells about this
latter person? Why do writings on digital cash often seem to echo Perritt's
confidence that the market will enhance democracy, peace, and freedom, making
the world a better place for us all?
I believe the answer lies, again, in conceptions of state, sovereignty, market,
and morality, conceptions that seem to hinge on the locus of origin of economic
transactions. Offshore transactions originate precisely "offshore", somewhere
else, a space imagined to lie outside of powerful sovereign states. At the same
time, for governments involved in offshore finance, it is the market that
demands offshore services be made available and the market which necessitates
that small states offer such services in order to survive in the world economy.
Digital cash transactions, on the other hand, happen within the domain of that
market, inside the heavens to which small states desperately want access.
Above, in the sovereign (in the sense of ordained, lofty, superordinate, like the
Deity over all else) space of this market, "good" individuals conduct "private"
transactions, without culture or politics or interests otherthan rational economic
self-interest. This heavenly market regulates itself; government intervention
would only cause it to fall to the ground in pieces.
86. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 77.
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Even as Caribbean states attempt to empty their citizenships of content by
offering them for sale on this market, offering their citizenships as empty place-
holders within which PTs can temporarily reside before moving on, they still
contain meaning, they still carry the mark that denies them entry into the
Kingdom of Heaven. An Antigua becomes a "corrupt, weak state"; people who
make use of Antiguan offshore financial services are "suspect"; people who
purchase citizenships or other legal statuses (or collect them, or are denied
them, as many international working-class migrants are as they move from
place to place) carry the taint that necessitated such a purchase (or collection)
in the first place. Not "truly" without culture like "real" participants in the
"global economy", they can never escape that original sin of having once
belonged to a place, a state, a sovereign territory that did not subordinate itself
to the "global market."
I am suggesting that when sovereignty is seen to reside in an abstraction
called "the market", then participants in that market, who accept that
sovereignty, become by definition "people without culture"," people supposedly
beyond and above "petty" localisms, people with "empty" identities. Such
people are "sovereign subjects", then, in that their identities are purely
subordinate to that of their sovereign, the sovereign market. But when
sovereignty seems to reside in a small state that uses its powers to craft niches
for flight capital to rest in, or when leaders of small states tweak the system,
like computer hackers, testing its limits and-attempting to reprogram its
operating procedures to their own advantage, then participants in this world are
seen as morally suspect, corrupt, and dangerous. They are not sovereign
subjects, but subjects who need continually to attempt to erase that essential
stain. This stain, of course, is the stain of origin-in the Third World, in the
former Soviet Union, in China or Taiwan or Hong Kong. It is also the stain of
the state: Antigua, unlike Microsoft, is a "state", and a "state" has no business
tweaking the "market."
The different moral assessments of offshore finance and digital cash I am
arguing, should lead us to call into question the assumptions motivating the kind
of world where Microsoft has powers denied states, where the market becomes
that lofty above, where some of"us" are allowed to be "people without culture"
whose subjectivities become normative and normalized and actively enforced for
the rest of the world, even as the rest of the world may have other intentions.
The real "suspects" here are ourselves-and here I mean mostly white citizens
87. See RENATOROSALDO, CULTURE AND TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS 198-204 (1989).
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of First World countries, with stable jobs, pension funds, and multiple
attachments to and investments in the global economy. Critiquing liberalism
means making explicit the privilege granted us by virtue of our origins to never
need to shop for citizenships, or evade or question sovereigns. The task, then,
is to expose ourselves: to open up the politics and culture of neo-liberalism, the
politics and culture of "the market" as it appears more and more to be a
sovereign domain, to show how it is always contested, negotiated, and
constructed in practices not necessarily of our choosing butjust perhaps within
our sovereign power to transform.

